Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: (i) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and (ii) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such models typically focuses on only one of these two dimensions. In this paper we consider both forecasting and optimization decisions in an experimental cobweb economy. We report results from four experimental treatments: (1) subjects form forecasts only, (2) subjects determine quantity only (solve an optimization problem), (3) they do both and (4) they are paired in teams and one member is assigned the forecasting role while the other is assigned the optimization task.
Introduction
Rational Expectations (RE) macroeconomic models have two crucial dimensions: (i) Rational agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, that is, they do not make systematic forecast mistakes. (ii) Given agents' rational expectations, these same agents solve optimization problems that determine their consumption and/or production decisions, which then, via market clearing, determine the realizations of prices and wages the agents were seeking to forecast; these data are then used to update forecasts. Thus, RE systems are self-referential; beliefs affect outcomes and outcomes affect beliefs.
Testing rational expectation models with field data is problematic as agents' expectations are not generally observable and economists may disagree as to what constitutes the "true" model in which agents' expectations are formed. An alternative approach is to test rational expectations models in the laboratory where it is possible to control the model that determines economic data and to elicit and use agents' expectations of future variables in the determination of that same data. However, the self-referential nature of RE models makes it difficult to test these models in the laboratory. As Sargent (2008) observes:
"Laboratory experiments using macroeconomics are rarer than those using microeconomics...I suspect that the main reason for fewer experiments in macro than in micro is that the choices confronting artificial agents within even one of the simpler recursive competitive equilibria used in macroeconomics are very complicated relative to the settings with which experimentalists usually confront subjects."
Experimentalists seeking to test RE macroeconomic models have dealt with the complicated nature of these models by reducing the dimensionality of the problem that subjects face. Two approaches have been taken.
In a "learning to forecast experiment," (LtFE) -a design first proposed by Marimon and Sunder (1993) -subjects are asked to submit a forecast for a future economic variable (e.g., a price, inflation rate, foreign exchange rate, etc.), and they are rewarded solely on the basis of the ex-post accuracy of their forecast. Their forecast is used as an input by a computer program to determine each individual's optimal quantities as if the subjects themselves were capable of solving the optimization problem conditional on their forecast. The computer-determined quantities together with market clearing conditions then determine the actual price realizations (the object of the agent's forecasts), and these realizations are then used to assess the accuracy of subjects' forecasts. Subjects, however, are not necessarily made aware of how their forecasts affect outcomes; the mechanism by which subjects' forecasts determine the actual realizations of forecasted variables often amounts to a "black-box" process.
In a second, older experimental approach, known as a "learning to optimize experiment" (LtOE), subjects are asked to make economic decisions (to consume, invest, trade, produce, etc.) directly, without any elicitation of their forecasts of the relevant endogenous variables such as the market price, interest rate or wages. Of course, such forecasts can be determined implicitly based on subjects' decisions or are sometimes determined separately via some market mechanism (e.g., a double auction or a call market) that is often external to the theory being tested.
Studies using the LtFE approach find mixed evidence as to whether subjects are able to learn a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) (see e.g., Hommes 2011 for a survey). In some instances, subjects learn a REE via some adaptive learning process while in other instances subjects behave as trend extrapolators resulting in persistent deviations or cycles around the rational expectations equilibrium. Similarly, findings from LtOE studies have sometimes confirmed competitive equilibrium predictions and associated comparative statics predictions, but in other instances have generated outcomes that are at odds with RE model predictions, for instance, non-rational bubbles, excess volatility, etc.
In this paper we compare the LtFE and LtOE approaches in a common, economic decision-making task. Importantly, we also consider how behavior improves or deteriorates if we combine these two approaches. Our combined LtFE and LtOE design gets at the heart of the belief-outcome interaction that is the signature property of rational expectations models. We ask if convergence to the REE and efficiency are affected when subjects are asked to play both roles as forecaster and optimizer or if specialization of tasks by individuals alone (as in LtFE and LtOE designs) or within two-agent teams leads to a significant improvement in performance. One aim of this research is to assess whether the results obtained in the LtFE literature are robust when the optimization task is performed by an individual rather than by a computer program. Moreover, our novel team specialization treatment has a very natural, realworld interpretation: Organizational investors such as investment banks and pension funds usually employ both professional forecasters (researchers and economists) and production managers or traders. This type of team specialization set-up has not been previously explored in the laboratory.
The experimental environment we study is a simple, N -firm cobweb model economy -a negative expectation feedback system. This kind of feedback system arises naturally in commodity markets that were the inspiration for Ezekiel's (1938) development of the cobweb model. Furthermore, Muth (1961) proposed rational expectations in the context of this very same negative feedback cobweb model. Prior research indicates that under a LtFE design, market prices will converge very quickly to the RE equilibrium in this environment. In addition to LtFE, we consider three additional treatments where subjects must submit their production decision directly without a forecast (LtOE), or together with a forecast, or subjects are paired in teams and one team member submits a forecast which the other team member can use to determine a production decision.
We find some tendency for the market price to converge to the REE price in all four treatments. Thus, the stabilizing effect of a negative feedback market is a robust feature of our experiment. However, when the volatility and speed of convergence are compared across treatments, we find that the market price converges most quickly and reliably when subjects only make price forecasts as in the computer-aided LtFE design. There is not much difference in performance between the treatment where subjects only make production decisions (LtOE) and the treatment where they form teams that specialize in one of the two tasks. However, the market price and quantity fluctuate the most and are the slowest to converge when subjects are required to perform both forecasting and production decision-making (optimizing) tasks. Our findings have important implications not only for the design of experiments, but more importantly for how we might think about the representative agent firm: should it be viewed as an individual actor (e.g., the C.E.O.) or is it better to think of the representative firm as consisting of teams of individuals specialized in various tasks, such as forecasting and production? Further, our decomposition of the forecasting and optimization tasks suggests that bounded rationality with respect to optimization decisions appears to be as important (if not a more important) a consideration in the learning of rational expectations equilibria as bounded rationality in expectation for-mation, which has been the primary focus of research on learning in macroeconomics to date (e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (2001) ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 presents the experimental results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
Our work is related to former LtFE and LtOE studies. (1993), , 1995 , Hommes et al. (2005 Hommes et al. ( , 2007 and Heemeijer et al. (2009) are some representative studies using the LtFE design.
As we also have a treatment where subjects participate as members of teams, our experiment is related to the literature on the comparison of group and individual decisions. In the experimental macroeconomics literature, Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli et al. (2005) show that monetary policy decisions made by groups of subjects acting a central bankers are not slower than the policy decisions made by individuals playing the same role as central banker, and that the group decisions are generally better (in the sense of minimizing a loss function). There is a parallel literature in experimental game theory on individual versus group decisions. The evidence from that literature is mixed on whether groups are more "rational" or selfinterested than individuals. For instance, Kocher and Sutter (2005) find that groups learn faster, and can beat individuals in play of a "beauty-contest" game. Cooper and Kagel (2005) report that groups act more strategically than individuals in the context of a signaling game. Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) find groups offer less and accept less in the "ultimatum game" relative to individuals. However, Cox (2002) shows that there is no significant difference between group and individual decisions in the "trust game." Cason and Mui (1997) find that groups offer more in "dictator games" than individuals. In all of these group-versus-individual-studies, group members are asked to perform/participate in the same kind of task, and the decision of the group is usually the average or majority choice of all group members. By contrast, our group (team) treatment involves specialization of tasks between the two group members, who share a common interest in maximizing their joint payoff; we are not aware of any prior group-versus-individual study with this type of specialization of tasks among the group members.
Our work is also related to experiments studying Cournot oligopoly models. Offerman, Potters and Sonnemans (2002) demonstrate that giving subjects in the role of firms different information about the behavior of other firms (subjects), e.g., information about the sum of other firms' quantity choices only, about individual firm's quantity choices only or about individual firm's quantity choices and profits, can lead to the adoption of different learning rules, and market evolution toward different equilibria (Walrasian, Collusive and Cournot-Nash). In our experiment, subjects playing the role of firms have no information about other firm's quantity choices or profits.
They also have no information about the relationship between the market price and total output. As the optimal quantity decision requires them to set price equal to marginal cost, the rational expectation equilibrium in this Cournot market is the same as the Walrasian outcome. Huck, Normann and Oechssler (1999) vary the information available to subjects from full information about the market including others' decisions and profits and their own decision and profit to only their own decision and profit. They report that none of their information treatments generate successful collusion, and that information that encourages "imitate the best" learning leads to a Walrasian outcome, which confirms the prediction of Vega-Redondo (1997). Their NOIN treatment, where subjects have no information about the behavior of other subjects (firms) is similar to the information that we provide to our subjects except that their subjects know the number of firms in the market. Their NOIN treatment generates an outcome that is very close to the Walrasian outcome and that is why we chose this informational structure for our experiment. However, as their environment involves a constant marginal cost, the optimal quantity given a price prediction is piecewise linear, and generates no steady state. It is therefore not possible to test convergence to REE using their experimental design.
Experimental Design

Treatments
Our experiment consists of four treatments that differ in the tasks assigned to participants and in the payoff scheme. Sample experimental instructions are provided in Appendix A. Subjects in our experiment play the role of firms only, deciding on price forecasts or on optimal amounts of production or both.
1. Treatment 1: the LtFE treatment. In this treatment, subjects (firms) only make price forecasts (or "predictions"). Given each firm's price forecast, their optimal production decision is calculated by the computer program. Aggregating the N firm's supply decisions and equating that aggregate supply with exogenous aggregate market demand results in an actual market price. Each subject is paid according to the accuracy of his price forecast, which is a function of the difference between his forecast price and the actual market price. Each subject knows the prior history of the market price they are attempting to forecast which is standard in the LtFE literature and the history of their own past forecasts and payoffs. Each subject was given a payoff table that showed their payoff from the forecasting task for different "prediction errors" (See Appendix E, "Payoff Table for Forecasting Task").
2. Treatment 2: the LtOE treatment. In this treatment, subjects (firms) only make quantity (or "production") decisions. Each subject knows the history of the market price, his own prior decisions and profits. Each subject makes a quantity decision only; there is no elicitation of a subject's price forecast.
The market price is again determined by the production decisions submitted by all firms in the market as equated with exogenous market demand. Each subject is paid according to the profit his firm makes each period. Subjects are given a table showing their potential payoff (profit) for different combinations of the market price and the subject's own production (optimization) decision (See Appendix E, "Payoff Table for Production Task").
3. Treatment 3: the LtFE+LtOE individual treatment. In this treatment, each subject plays the role of both forecaster and production manager. Each subject knows the history of the market price, his prior decisions and profits. Each subject makes both a price forecast and a quantity decision. The market price is again determined by the production decisions submitted by all firms in the market as equated with exogenous market demand. Subjects are paid according to an equal weighted linear combination of the payoff functions used in the LtFE and LtOE treatments. Each subject can read his potential payoffs for the forecasting task from the payoff table for forecasters, and his potential payoffs from the production (optimization) task from the payoff for quantity decisions (same tables as in Treatments 1 and 2, respectively).
4. Treatment 4: the LtFE+LtOE team treatment. In this treatment, there is a forecaster and a production manager in each two-agent team. The forecaster knows the history of market prices, and the production manager knows the history of his own production decisions and profits. The market price is determined by the production decisions of all firms in the market in combination with exogenous market demand. Each subject is paid according to an equal weighted linear combination of the payoff functions used in the LtFE and LtOE treatments, exactly as in treatment 3. Subjects can read the potential payoffs for the forecasting task from the payoff table for forecasters, and the potential payoffs for the production task from the payoff for quantity decisions (same tables as in Treatments 1 and 2, respectively).
We restricted price forecasts to be non-negative and we set 60 as the upper bound for price predictions as this is the maximum possible price when all firms produce 0. The quantity decision was also restricted to be non-negative, and we set 20 as the upper bound for the quantity decision as the payoff for the production manager would be negative if he chose to produce more than 20 units when the price is 0.
Number of Observations
We report results from 8 experimental sessions that were conducted using the CREED laboratory at the University of Amsterdam on April 27-29 and on May 3, 2011. A total of 180 subjects participated in the 8 sessions of this experiment. These subjects are mainly bachelor and master students at the University of Amsterdam. No subject participated in more than one session. Each session involved multiple groups of N = 6 or N = 12 participants who interacted with one another for 50 periods in one of our four treatments, that is, we adopt a "between subjects" design. We refer to each independent observation, involving N = 6 or 12 subjects interacting together for 50 periods under the same treatment conditions as a "market." A summary of the number of markets (observations) and the number of participants per market for each of our four treatments is given in Table 1 . Notice that in treatments 1, 2 and 3 we always had 6 subjects (or firms) per market, while in our team treatment 4 we had 12 subjects per market so that each of the 6 "firms" consisted of a pair of players (a "team") who remained matched together for all 50 periods of the market.
Prior to the first period of each market, we asked subjects to answer some comprehension ("control") questions designed to test their understanding of the written instructions. Subjects were not allowed to begin participating until they had correctly answered all of these questions. The instructions and control questions are given in Appendix A. A typical experimental session lasted between one and a half to two hours. The payoffs earned by subjects were between 15 and 25 euros.
Theoretical Model
The model is of demand and supply for a single, non-storable good. Denote by D the nonnegative and monotonically decreasing demand function for this good and by S h,t , the nonnegative supply function for the good by firm h, derived from expected profit maximization at period t. Let p e h,t be the price forecast made by firm h in period t. The supply function may be rewritten as S(p e h,t ). We assume that all firms have the same supply function. Subjects play only the role of firms (suppliers) in the experiment; demand is exogenously given (as described below).
The market price is determined by the market clearing condition for a cobweb economy, which is given by:
where t ∼ N (0, 1) is the realization of an i.i.d. price shock in period t.
We assume there are H firms (suppliers), differing only in the way they form expectations. We use a linear demand function D(p t ) = a − bp t , where a = 63, b = 21 20 .
We assume that each firm has a cost function c(q) =
. The expected profit of firm h, π e h,t , is given by:
Solving the profit maximization problem yields the optimal supply function for each firm:
H
. If every firm makes supply decisions optimally, the total supply on the market will coincide with the mean price forecasts, h S * (p e h,t ) = p e t . Substituting this optimal market supply into the market clearing condition (equation 1) and noting that the expected value of the noise term is zero, we have that:
Imposing the RE assumption (p * = E[ 20 21 (63 − p * ) + t ]), we find the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) price, p * = 30.73. The optimal supply in this REE is 5.12, and the profit for each firm is 78.70.
Subjects were not informed of the precise demand function as detailed in this section nor were they informed of the total quantity supplied (the quantity decisions of the other H − 1 firms in their market). However, they were told that market demand was decreasing in the market price and that the market price was determined by market clearing, i.e., that supply equals demand -see the Instructions in Appendix A for the specific details.
Computer Interface
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the computer interface that subjects saw in the experiment, specifically for treatment 4. The screen was divided into 3 mini pages. In the top mini page, subjects were prompted to submit their decisions, i.e., their price forecast or their quantity production choice. In the bottom left mini page they saw a graph plotting past market prices (the "Real Price") and, if they were a forecaster, they also saw their past price forecast history ("Your Prediction"). Finally, in the bottom right mini page they saw a table reporting the history of realized (market) prices, as well as their own prior decisions and their period and cumulative payoffs.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the computer interface that forecasters saw in treatment 4. The computer interface the forecasters saw in treatment 1 is very similar to the one shown for forecasters in treatment 4, except that the history of past performance (points earned) was shown only for the forecasting task and not for the production task as in treatment 4.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the computer interface the production managers saw in treatment 4. At the start of each period these production managers saw a notice "we wait for your partner to give a forecast" in the screen. Once the forecaster/team partner has submitted his/her forecast, the production manager was informed of this forecast (as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 ) and he or she then entered a quantity decision for the team.
The computer interface that subjects see in treatment 2 is very similar to that shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 except that there is no waiting phase and the history of past performance is only for the optimization (production) task instead of for both the forecasting and production tasks as in treatment 4. The computer interface in treatment 3 is also similar to the one shown in Figure 1 except that there is no waiting phase and the same subject is asked to first submit a price forecast and then to submit a quantity decision. The history of past performance for treatment 
Payoffs
Subjects earned points during the experiment that were converted into euros at the end of the experiment at a known and fixed rate. The payoff function for forecasters (in points) is a decreasing function of their prediction error, and was given by:
Payoff for Forecasting Task = max 1300 − 1300 49
Notice that subjects earn 0 if their price forecast error is greater than 7, and they earn a maximum of 1300 for a perfect forecast.
The payoff function for the production (optimization) task (in points) was given by:
Payoff from the Production Task = p t q t − c(q t ) + 1200.
Notice that subjects get a baseline 'salary' of 1200 points plus the actual profit earned by their firm, which depends on the market determined price, p t and on the quantity, q t , chosen by their firm. A firm's profit can be negative, so a subject's payoff can be smaller than 1200. However, our set-up implies that the maximum possible loss (the absolute value of negative profit) is 1200 (which is the loss a firm will make when the market price is 0 and it is producing 20 units of goods), so that each subject's total payoff can never be negative. As the profit for the firm when the market price equals the REE price is about 80, the maximum payoff earned by a subject as a forecaster or as a production manager is approximately the same, at around 1300 points per period.
Subjects in treatment 1 earn the payoff from the forecasting task only. Subjects in treatment 2 earn the payoff from the production task only. Subjects in treatments 3 and 4 each earn the equally weighted average of the payoffs from the forecasting and production tasks. These payoff functions were carefully explained to subjects in the written instructions and were presented to subjects as payoff tables (see Appendix A). At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid 1 euro for each 2600 points they earned in all 50 periods of the experiment and this conversion rate was known to subjects in advance. Figure 2 plots the average market prices in each treatment against the REE price, p * = 30.73. We see that the average price in all four treatments gets very close to the REE price, especially in the later periods of the experiment. Thus, the general tendency for a negative feedback system to converge to a REE is not greatly affected by the type of task (forecasting or optimizing or both) that is assigned to market participants. However, the adjustment towards the REE at the beginning of the experiment is fastest in treatment 1 and is slowest in treatment 3. The volatility of the market price is also smallest in treatment 1, and largest in treatment 3.
Experimental Results
Aggregate Market Price
As a first check on whether prices are, in fact, converging to the RE prediction, we declare convergence to have occurred in the first period for which the difference between the market price and the REE price is less than 5 and stays below 5 forever after that period. Using this simple criterion, we count the number of periods required before convergence across our different treatments, as reported in Table 2 . If there is no convergence according to our criterion, as is the case for 5 markets in treatment 3, then we count the number of periods to convergence as the full sample size of 50
periods. Comparing these time-to-convergence numbers, we observe that the market price converges faster in treatment 1 than in the other three treatments (the difference is significant at the 5% level according to a two sided Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test using the independent market observations for each treatment). We further observe that convergence is faster in treatments 2 and 4 than in treatment 3 (the difference is significant at the 5% level according to a Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test). Finally, treatment 4 converges slightly faster than treatment 2 on average, but that difference is not significant at 5% level according to a Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test.
For a second view of convergence, Figure 3 plots the average difference between the market price and the REE price using data from all markets of each treatment. Finally we can test for convergence econometrically using a method suggested by Duffy (2008) . For each market j, the following linear equation is estimated:
The results of this estimation exercise are reported in Appendix B. We note first that all of the estimated µs are significantly different from 0 at the 5% level of significance, and all the estimated λs are significantly different from 0 at 5% level except markets 23 (the third market in treatment 2), 34 (the fourth market in treatment 3) and 42
(the second market in treatment 4). We also checked for evidence of serially correlated errors. For our estimation, the relevant upper bound of the Durbin-Watson statistic, dU , (n = 50, k = 2) is 1.445. We found that for each market, the estimated DurbinWatson statistics were always greater than that upper bound, which implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation in the error terms. Summarizing the estimation results (as reported in Appendix B), we have:
1. All markets in all four treatments satisfy weak convergence. We see a large difference between treatment 3 and the other three treatments. The difference between treatments 3 and 4 in particular suggests that teamwork and specialization may help participants to make optimal decisions.
Individual-Level Decisions 4.2.1 Distribution of Decisions
We have seen that the aggregate market price gets close to the REE price in many markets. It is of interest to consider whether decisions at the individual level are also consistent with RE predictions. The empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of individual price forecasts and optimization (quantity-choice) decisions is shown in Figure 4 using pooled data from all markets of the relevant treatments (treatments 1, 2 and 4 for the price forecasts and treatments 2, 3 and 4 for the quantity choices). Under rational expectations the CDF should be a step function switching from 0 to 100% at the RE price (re=30.73) or quantity (qre=5.12). 
Time Taken to Make Decisions
We also collected data on the time it took for subjects to make their decision(s).
Such data can be useful in understanding the cognitive difficulty of decision-making.
In particular, Rubinstein (2007) provides evidence that choices requiring greater cog- nitive activity are associated with longer decision response times. While there was no decision time limit in our experiment (subjects could take as much time as they wished for each decision), the computer program that implements our experiment start counting (in seconds) when a subject first entered each new period, and stopped counting when he or she submitted his or her decision(s). Figure 5 plots the empirical CDF of the time taken by subjects in each period of treatments 1, 2 and 3 2 . As subjects submit their forecasts and quantity decisions together in treatment 3, the decision-time data for treatment 3 is the total time taken for both the forecasting and optimizing tasks. between treatments 1 and 2 is not significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that subjects did not find the optimization task to be more cognitively difficult than the forecasting task but that making two decisions, as in treatment 3, is indeed more cognitively challenging than making a single decision as in treatments 1 and 2.
Variance of the Market Price and M.S.D. from REE
The variance of the market price and the mean squared deviation (M.S.D.) of prices from the REE in our experiment are shown in Table 3 . We calculate these numbers 
Individual Forecasts
The upper panel of Figure 6 shows the time series of the average individual price forecasts in treatments 1, 3 and 4 against the REE price. We observe that treatment 1 (diamonds) converges fastest, followed by treatment 4 (triangles), and that treatment 3 (squares) is the slowest to converge. The lower panel of Figure 6 shows the average variance of individual forecasts in treatments 1, 3 and 4. There we observe that heterogeneity of forecasts is greatest in treatment 3, and there is not much difference between treatments 1 and 4.
Prior experimental work (Heemeijer et al, 2009 ) suggests that subjects tend to use simple heuristics in learning to forecast experiments. Two natural candidates Table 3 : MSD from REE and variance of prices for each market.
that are often used in negative feedback markets (such as the one studied here) are adaptive expectations:
and trend extrapolation rules:
The estimated value for γ is typically negative in the negative-feedback market setting that we consider, so we will refer to the trend extrapolation rule (8) as the "contrarian rule" to differentiate this rule from the trend-following version of the same rule where γ is positive. We estimate these two types of rules for each individual subject in our experiment. We call an estimation successful if it generates coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level, and if there is no serial correlation in the errors. It turns out that more than 75% of subjects can be successfully characterized by both adaptive rules. In those cases we compare the R 2 value for each estimated model and characterize the individual as following the estimated rule having the larger R 2 value. The distribution of individual subjects over the types of forecasting rules is shown in Table 4, while the Tables in Appendix C show the estimation results for the subjects who can be successfully identified using a single rule. Table 4 : The fraction of subjects who are characterized by one of the two price forecasting rules (Adaptive or Contrarian) or Neither of the two rules.
In all three treatments 50% or more subjects can be categorized by the adaptive rule. However, we note that there are relatively more subjects using the adaptive rule in treatment 1 than in treatments 3 or 4. Relating this result to the observed stability of the markets, it would appear that the market price is more stable when there are overwhelmingly more subjects using the adaptive rule.
Individual Supply Decisions 4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
The time series of the average supplies in treatment 2, 3 and 4 are plotted against the REE supply in the top panel of Figure 7 . As with prices, we see that quantity in treatment 3 (squares) converges towards the REE level in a rather sluggish manner, and there is not much difference in the average quantity supplied over time between treatments 2 (diamonds) and 4 (triangles). The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows the average variance of supply in each treatment. We again observe that the heterogeneity of supply decisions is greatest in treatment 3, and there is not much difference between treatments 2 and 4.
Conditional Optimality of the Supply Decision
Recall that if the production manager acts optimally with respect to his own forecast or his partner's forecast, the manager should choose to supply a quantity that is equal to 1/6 of the firm's price prediction, i.e., S * (p e h,t ) = p e h,t
6
. Do production managers make decisions in this manner? Figure 8 shows the average difference between the supply chosen by the production manager and the optimal supply given his own or his paired forecaster's forecast in treatments 3 and 4, respectively. If production managers make decisions optimally, this difference should be zero. 
Estimation of Supply Strategies
We are interested in the possible cause of the deviation of managers' supply decisions from the conditionally optimal decision given price predictions in treatments 3 and 4. To address this issue further, we estimate a simple linear production strategy specification for each firm of the form:
If a production manager is a conditional optimizer, the results of the regression analysis should yield estimates of c 0 = 0 and c 1 = 1/6 for each individual firm. There are certainly many other independent variables that could also be included in the specification of firms' production decisions. However, as the production managers in Treatment 4 do not see information such as the price forecast history, and the forecaster/production managers in treatment 3 should have incorporated all other information into their price forecasts, equation (9) seems a reasonable choice for comparing behavior between treatments 3 and 4 and that is why we chose to work with this specification. As with our price forecasting rule estimation, we again discard any estimations for production decisions with serial correlation in the error term leaving We can classify subjects in their role as production managers according to three types:
1. Unconditional supply (type U ), if c 0 is significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level while c 1 is not significantly different from zero. In this case, the subject is essentially supplying a constant amount to the market in each period.
2. Conditionally optimal supply (type C), if c 0 is not significantly different from zero, c 1 is significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level and further that the null hypothesis that c 1 = 1/6 cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
In this case we can characterize the subject as having chosen to supply the conditionally optimal quantity for the given price forecast.
3. Hybrid strategy (type H), if both c 0 and c 1 are significantly different from zero.
In this case, the subject chooses a constant quantity as a psychological anchor and adjusts it a little for different expected price levels.
All the successful estimations can be classified according to one of these three types. Table 5 shows the shares of the three different types of production strategies in treatments 3 and 4. In treatment 3 there are 4 subjects using the constant, unconditional supply strategy (U ), 2 using the conditionally optimal supply strategy (C) and 7 using a hybrid strategy (H). In treatment 4 there is just 1 subject using the constant, unconditional supply strategy, 9 using the conditionally optimal supply strategy and 8 using the hybrid strategy. Thus, about half of all subjects (for whom we could identify a supply strategy) use a hybrid strategy in both treatments. For the remaining population, a majority uses the constant supply strategy in treatment 3 while in treatment 4, the majority uses the conditionally optimal strategy. This result suggests that subjects do behave in a systematically different manner between treatments 3 and 4. In treatment 3, many subjects choose to use the constant supply strategy which requires minimal cognitive cost, but which destabilizes the market when they choose the wrong (usually too high) quantity. By contrast, in treatment 4, there is a larger percentage of subjects in the production manager role who make use of the conditionally optimal strategy, given their partner's forecast. This difference may arise from the specialization of tasks in the team treatment. Table 5 : Distribution of estimated production strategies in treatments 3 and 4. Here U denotes use of the unconditional constant supply strategy, C denotes use of the conditionally optimal supply strategy and H denotes use of the hybrid strategy. We report both the number of subjects who are successfully characterized by each strategy in the column "number" and the percentage of each strategy among all successful characterizations in the column "percentage."
Rational Expectations (RE) macro models have two crucial dimensions: (i) Agents correctly forecast future prices using all available information (i.e., they do not make systematic mistakes) and (ii) Given these expectations, agents solve optimization problems and their solutions (together with market clearing conditions) then determine actual price realizations, that is, there is belief-outcome interaction. These two important dimensions are difficult to simultaneously observe in field data but have been previously addressed separately in learning to forecast experiments (LtFE) and in learning to optimize experiments (LtOE). This paper is the first to explore both dimensions of decision-making in the context of the same expectations-based cobweb model. Specifically, we consider both LtFE and LtOE treatments but we also add two additional treatments where subjects perform both the forecasting or optimizing tasks either independently or as members of a team. Our findings suggest that all four approaches give the same qualitative long-run result, namely convergence to the REE in the context of a cobweb economy with negative feedback, but that the speed of convergence differs across approaches.
Among all the treatments, the LtFE treatment converges more quickly and reliably than the other three treatments. This finding is readily explained by the fact that the forecasting task is considerably easier for subjects than the optimizing task (which is automated in the LtFE design) and therefore behavior in LtFE studies should be regarded as an upper bound on the rationality that can be achieved in a laboratory experimental evaluation of RE models. The combined LtFE+LtOE design of treatment 3 is the least reliable and slowest to converge to REE. However, the latter treatment corresponds most closely to what is expected of agents in rational expectations models, i.e., that individual agents are capable of both forecasting and optimizing. The current macroeconomic literature on the learning of rational expectations equilibria typically focuses on bounded rationality in agents' expectation formation alone and not on agents' ability to solve optimization problems (see, e.g.,
Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). An important implication of the findings reported in this paper is that future modeling of the learning of rational expectations equilibria should also allow for bounded rationality in agents' ability to optimize.
At a more microeconomic level, estimation of individual forecast rules suggests that there is not much difference in the price prediction strategies that subjects use across the different treatments of our experiment, although we observe a much higher percentage of adaptive learners in the computer-assisted treatment 1. Estimation of the supply strategies suggests that there are important differences in the strategies used between treatments 3 and 4. Specifically we find that the use of conditionally optimal supply strategies given price forecasts is more prevalent when subjects interact in teams (treatment 4) than when they act alone (treatment 3).
Indeed, we find evidence in support of the notion that "two heads are better than one" in the sense that behavior in treatment 4 is more rational (closer to RE predictions) than is behavior in treatment 3, even in the aspect of consistency (how close the production decision is to the conditionally optimal decision for the given price forecast). This finding is also consistent with the real world observation that large financial firms often have separate forecasting and trading departments, and rarely let one department perform the task of the other.
Our method of comparing and combining LtFE and LtOE experimental methods could also be studied in the context of market environments involving dynamic, state dependent variables, or positive expectation feedback. We leave such extensions to future research. makes a decision about the quantity of the good the firm will produce. Your forecast is the only information the firm (production manager) has on the future market price.
The more accurate your prediction is, the better the quality of your firm's (partner's) decision will be, and the more profit your firm can earn. In each period, you (and your partner) will get a payoff based on the accuracy of your prediction (and the quality of production decisions).
The information you can refer to consists of a plot of all your past prices and your pre- 
About the price determination
The price is determined by the market clearing condition, meaning that it will be such that the supply equals demand.
The supply on the market is determined by the production decision of the producers.
There are several large producers on this market and each of them is advised by a forecaster like you. Usually, higher price predictions lead a firm to produce a larger quantity, which increases the supply and vice versa. Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies of these producers, although there may be small random fluctuations caused by transportation delay or other reasons.
The size of the demand for the product depends upon the price. When the price goes up, the demand will go down.
About your job
Your only task in this experiment is to predict the market price in each time period as accurately as possible. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1. When all forecasters have submitted their price predictions for the first period, the firms (production managers) will then determine the quantity to supply, and the market price for period 1 will be determined and made public to all participants. Based on your price prediction (and your partner's production decisions), your earnings for period 1 will be calculated.
Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period 2. When all participants have submitted their predictions (and production decisions) for the second period, the market price for that period will be determined and made public and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for all 50 consecutive periods. The information you can refer to consists of all previous prices, your predictions and earnings.
About your payoff
(Your payoff depends on both the performance of your forecasting task and your partner's production decision task. You and your partner will each get one half of the payoff from the forecasting task and one half of the payoff from the quantity production task). The payoff for the forecasting task depends on the accuracy of your predictions. The earnings shown on the computer screen will be in terms of points.
The maximum possible points you can make for the forecasting task is 1300 for each period, and the larger your prediction error is, the fewer points you earn. You will earn 0 points if your prediction error is larger than 7. You have a Payoff Table which shows the points you can earn for different prediction errors. (Your forecast accuracy will not affect you payoff from the production task, but more accurate forecasts may help your partner to make better production decisions).
We will pay you in cash at the end of the experiment based on the points you earned in all 50 periods. You earn 1 euro for each 2600 points you earn. 
A.1.2 Instruction for the Production Manager
General information
In this experiment you participate in a market. Your role in the market is as a Production Manager of a large firm, and the firm is a major Producer of one product sold in the market. In each period the firm asks you to make a decision on the quantity your firm will supply to the market. You are going to play this role for 50 successive time periods.
(At the beginning of the experiment, you and another participant, a Forecaster who is your partner, are assigned to form a team and you will keep cooperating together throughout the experiment. In each period you will receive a prediction for the price in this period from your partner, and make a decision about the quantity of goods your firm should produce.) The better the quality of your decision is, the more profit your firm can earn.
The information you can refer to consists of a plot of past prices, a table containing the history of your past decisions and the payoff (of your team) in (forecasting and) production tasks. (You partner sees a plot of the past price and his/her own forecasts, a table containing the history of his/her past forecasts and the payoff of your team in forecasting and production tasks.)
About the price determination
The supply on the market is determined by the production decisions of the produc-ers. Usually, higher price predictions lead a firm to produce a larger quantity, which increases the supply and vice versa. Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies of these producers, although there may be small random fluctuations caused by transportation delay or other reasons.
The size of the demand for the product depends upon the price. When the price goes up, the demand will go down. We will pay you in cash at the end of the experiment based on the number of points you earned in all 50 periods. You earn 1 Euro for each 2600 points you earn.
About your job
The equation that determines your payoff from the production task
The payoff for the production task can be written as the following equation:
Payoff from the Production Task = p t q t − c(q t ) + 1200
Where p t is the market price of this good in period t, and you can use your (partner's) prediction as a proxy. q t is the amount of product you decide to let the firm produce.
c(q t ) = 3q 2 t , which is the cost function. Therefore p t q t − c(q t ) is the net profit of the firm, which coincides in numbers with your bonus. The higher the profit of the firm, the higher your bonus will be. You get 1200 points as a baseline "salary". But the profit of the firm can be negative, so the payoff from the production task can be smaller than 1200.
A.2 Control Questions
We ask each subject control questions before they can start the experiment. The questions are different for subjects who perform the forecasting task and those who perform quantity decision task. Forecasters in treatment 1 and 4 and production managers in treatment 2 need to answer 3 questions. Production managers in treatment 4 and subjects in treatment 3 need to answer 4 questions. The questions and answers for forecasters and production managers in treatment 4 are listed below.
The control questions and answers for forecasters and production managers in other treatments are the same except for the fact that we switch between the term "you", "your partner" and "your team" according to the context, and production managers in treatment 2 do not answer the first question (about payoff for the forecasting task) for production managers in treatment 4. Table 7 : Estimation results for subjects in Treatment 1 who could be successfully categorized by one of the two forecasting rules. In the "Type" column, "A" means adaptive rule while "C" means contrarian/trend extrapolation rule. Table 8 : Estimation results for subjects in Treatment 3 who could be successfully categorized by one of the two forecasting rules. In the "Type" column, "A" means adaptive rule while "C" means contrarian/trend extrapolation rule. Table 9 : Estimation results for subjects in Treatment 4 who could be successfully categorized by one of the two forecasting rules. In the "Type" column, "A" means adaptive rule while "C" means contrarian/trend extrapolation rule. Table 11 : Estimated coefficients of the supply strategy used by the subjects in Treatment 4. In the "Type" column, "C" means use of the constant supply strategy, "O" means use of the conditionally optimal supply strategy and "H" means use of the hybrid strategy. Tables   E.1 Payoff Table for Forecasters Below is the payoff table for the forecasting task in treatments 1,3 and 4. Figure 10 : The payoff table for production managers, page 2.
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